The Case Against Felon Voting

Roger Clegg, George T. Conway III, and Kenneth K. Lee

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Today, from the bluest of the blue to the reddest of the red, almost every single state in the Union—forty-eight out of fifty—forbids felons from voting to varying degrees. The District of Columbia also has a felon disenfranchisement law on its books to which the U.S. Congress acquiesced. And although some states have restored the franchise to felons who have finished serving their sentences, the vast majority of states have continued to retain and adopt laws that prohibit felons from voting during their terms in prison. For example, convicts in Massachusetts could vote, even while in jail, until 2000. That November, however, the Bay State’s voters faced a ballot question on a proposed state constitutional amendment to take away the incarcerated felons’ franchise. The amendment passed by a landslide, with sixty percent voting yes and only thirty-four percent voting no. So, too, with Utah. Incarcerated felons had the right to vote there until 1998, when the state’s voters similarly approved a constitutional amendment taking away the felons’ franchise. The proposition passed virtually by acclamation, eighty-two percent to eighteen percent.

Although forty-eight states have already spoken in their support for felon disenfranchisement, others have championed felon voting rights as the latest cause célèbre. The issue gained additional traction recently after several academics noted that Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore would have triumphed in Florida in 2000 and won the presidency, had felons been permitted to vote in that state. But the case for letting felons vote is simply unconvincing and problematic both as a legal and policy matter.

As a legal matter, felon disenfranchisement laws have long been accepted in the American legal system and easily pass constitutional muster. Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly permits states to adopt disenfranchisement statutes, and many such laws were enacted long before African-Americans enjoyed suffrage. These laws are also beyond the reach of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”). The legislative history of the VRA and its 1982 amendments, as well as common sense, makes it perfectly clear that the statute was not intended to cover felon disenfranchisement laws. Moreover, the VRA cannot be construed to encompass felon disenfranchisement laws because it would then exceed the enforcement powers of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Finally and most fundamentally, there are compelling policy rationales for such laws: society deems felons to be less trustworthy and responsible than non-felon citizens, and those who cannot follow the law should not participate in the passing of laws that govern law-abiding citizens.

* Roger Clegg is the president and general counsel of the Center for Equal Opportunity in Sterling, Virginia. George T. Conway III is a partner at the law firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz in New York City. Kenneth K. Lee is an associate also at Wachtell Lipton. The authors submitted an amici brief on behalf of three family members of Joseph A. Piagentini, the Center for Equal Opportunity, and the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in the en banc appeal in Muntaqim v. Coomb in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This paper is adapted from the authors’ recently published article, The Bullet and the Ballot? The Case for Felon Disenfranchisement Statutes, 14 AM. U.J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & LAW 1 (2006).
I. The Race-Neutral History and Constitutionality of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws

About a month before the 2004 presidential election, the Associated Press ran a newswire article stating that felon disenfranchisement laws “have roots in the post-Civil War [nineteenth] century and were aimed at preventing black Americans from voting.” Numerous other media outlets, including the New York Times, Washington Post and USA Today, also made similar statements about the origins of felon disenfranchisement statutes. But there was one problem with such statements—they simply were not true.

Contrary to the perceived wisdom of the mainstream media, felon disenfranchisement laws are deeply rooted in Western tradition as well as American history. As Judge Henry Friendly explained, the Lockean notion of a social compact undergirds laws preventing felons from voting: someone “who breaks the laws” may “fairly have been thought to have abandoned the right to participate” in making them. Alexander Keyssar, a Harvard professor and a critic of felon disenfranchisement laws, has acknowledged that such laws have “a long history in English, European, and even Roman law.” Similarly, a report issued by the Sentencing Project and Human Rights Watch conceded that “[d]isenfranchisement in the U.S. is a heritage from ancient Greek and Roman traditions carried into Europe.” And in recently upholding Florida’s statute barring felons from voting, the en banc Eleventh Circuit observed that “[f]elon disenfranchisement laws are unlike other voting qualifications” in that they are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history.”

In the late eighteenth century, several states began passing felon disenfranchisement statutes. Between 1776 and 1821, eleven states disenfranchised persons convicted of certain “infamous” crimes. By the eve of the Civil War, more than two dozen states out of thirty-four had enacted laws preventing those convicted of committing serious crimes from casting a vote. And by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, twenty-nine states had established felon disenfranchisement laws.

That long history refutes any suggestion that felon disenfranchisement provisions are racially motivated. Their antebellum origins show that they were aimed at whites and were maintained for race-neutral reasons: before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states were free to, and the vast majority did, impose direct and express racial qualifications on the franchise. As the en banc Eleventh Circuit observed in upholding Florida’s felon disenfranchisement law, “at that time, the right to vote was not extended to African-Americans, and, therefore, they could not have been the targets of any [felon] disenfranchisement law.”

Over seventy percent of the states in the Union in 1861 had felon disenfranchisement laws—at a time when most African-Americans were still enslaved and did not have the right to vote. The pre-Civil War source of these laws “indicates that felon disenfranchisement was not an attempt to evade the requirements of the Civil War Amendments or to perpetuate racial discrimination forbidden by those amendments.”

The framers of the Civil War Amendments saw nothing racially discriminatory about felon disenfranchisement. To the contrary, they expressly recognized the power of the states to prohibit felons from voting. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state’s
denial of voting rights “for participation in rebellion, or other crime” could not serve as a basis for reducing their representation in Congress. As the Supreme Court held in Richardson v. Ramirez, Section 2 is thus “an affirmative sanction” by the Constitution of “the exclusion of felons from the vote”—even felons who, like the plaintiffs in Ramirez, had finished their sentences. This conclusion

rests on the demonstrably sound proposition that § 1 [the Equal Protection Clause], in dealing with voting rights as it does, could not have been meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from the less drastic sanction of reduced representation which § 2 imposed for other forms of disenfranchisement.

Thus, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment “expressly permits states to disenfranchise convicted felons.”

Nor did the Reconstruction Congress see any conflict between felon disenfranchisement and the Fifteenth Amendment. As the Supreme Court observed at length in Ramirez, Congress, in readmitting states to the Union, consistently approved state constitutions that excluded felons from the franchise. In fact, the Fortieth Congress—the very same Congress that proposed the Fifteenth Amendment—approved such constitutions, and the next Congress did so both before and after the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified.

In light of their historical origin, felon disenfranchisement laws easily pass constitutional muster. As any student of constitutional law knows, the Constitution bars only laws that are facially discriminatory or are motivated by intentional discrimination. But it appears that all of the felon disenfranchisement statutes on the books today were enacted or amended with a race-neutral purpose. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has consistently held not only that “the states had both a right to disenfranchise [felons and] ex-felons,” but that they had “a compelling interest in doing so.” As early as 1890, for example, the Supreme Court held that a territorial legislature’s statute that “exclude[d] from the privilege of voting . . . those who have been convicted of certain offenses” was “not open to any constitutional or legal objection.” A unanimous Warren Court decision recognized that a “criminal record” is one of the “factors which a State may take into consideration in determining the qualifications of voters.” Today’s Court agrees: holding “that a convicted felon may be denied the right to vote” remains “unexceptionable.”

II. The Voting Rights Act’s Inapplicability to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws

A. The Legislative History of the Voting Rights Act and Its Amendments

Federal circuit courts are split as to whether the Voting Rights of 1965 (as amended by the 1982 amendment) can invalidate felon disenfranchisement statutes on the grounds that such laws have a racially disproportionate impact on minorities. While the Ninth Circuit has expressly held that the VRA can cover felon disenfranchisement laws, the en banc Eleventh Circuit has ruled that it does not reach such laws. And the en banc Second Circuit heard oral argument on this issue in June 2005, but has not yet issued an opinion. The more sensible and reasonable interpretation of the VRA is that Congress did not intend it to apply to felon disenfranchisement
Congress passed the VRA to address various exclusionary practices that had been historically employed in the South to prevent blacks from voting. There is no reasonable indication in either the language or the legislative history of the original VRA that it was intended to cover felon disenfranchisement statutes. The only provision of the Act that Congress thought could even remotely implicate felon disenfranchisement was Section 4 of the Act, which prohibits any requirement of “good moral character” to vote. But the Senate Judiciary Committee’s report—joined by Senators Dodd, Hart, Long, Kennedy, Bayh, Burdick, Tydings, Dirksen, Hruska, Fong, Scott and Javits—took pains to note that even that provision “would not result in the proscription of the frequent requirement of States and political subdivisions that an applicant for voting or registration for voting be free of conviction of a felony.” On the floor, Senator Tydings repeated the point: the law would not bar states from imposing “a requirement that an applicant for voting or registration be free of conviction of a felony. . . . These grounds for disqualification are objective, easily applied, and do not lend themselves to fraudulent manipulation.” The House Judiciary Committee report agreed: “[The VRA] does not proscribe a requirement of a State or any political subdivision of a State that an applicant for voting or registration for voting be free of conviction of a felony . . . .” These are the only references to felon disenfranchisement made in reports to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Thus, its legislative history shows that Congress did not intend the VRA to cover felon disenfranchisement laws.

In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 of the VRA to bar procedures that “result” in the denial or abridgment of voting rights “on account of race or color.” The purpose of this amendment was to overrule certain Supreme Court decisions that Congress believed were contrary to the original intent of the statute. The amended statutory text, however, is notably ambiguous, and so “[u]nfortunately, it ‘is exceedingly difficult to discern what [Section 2] means.’” While the introduction of the word “result” arguably indicates that it might cover state actions not motivated by racial animus, the statute also incorporates the critical language in Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition of intentional racial discrimination—“[d]en[ial] or abridg[ment]” of the right to vote “on account of race [or] color.” As discussed more fully below, the use of the words “‘on account of’” means that “[t]he existence of some form of racial discrimination . . . remains the cornerstone of [Section 2] claims,” and shows that “Congress did not wholly abandon its focus on purposeful discrimination when it amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982.”

The tension between “results in” and “on account of” renders the provision ambiguous. Indeed, it is precisely because of this ambiguity that the Supreme Court relied upon the 1982 legislative history to come up with the so-called Gingles “factors” in order to give content to Section 2. Ironically, the litigants who have launched VRA challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws seek to rely on this legislative history, which does not specifically deal with felon disenfranchisement, while ignoring the extensive legislative history that specifically dealt with the subject.

The legislative history of the 1982 amendments reflects not the slightest suggestion that Congress changed the original intent to preserve felon disenfranchisement. Indeed, even though it “details many discriminatory techniques used by certain jurisdictions,” “[t]here is simply no
discussion of felon disenfranchisement in the legislative history surrounding the 1982 amendments.”45 Given that forty-six states in 1982 had felon disenfranchisement laws, it seems inconceivable that Congress would sub silentio amend the Voting Rights Act to invalidate the laws of forty-six states, many of which have had such statutes since the founding of the Republic.46

Overturning felon disenfranchisement remains unfathomable to Congress to this very day. The VRA’s utterly “one-sided legislative history is buttressed by subsequent Congressional acts. Since 1982, Congress has made it easier for states to disenfranchise felons.”47 The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 not only provides that a felony conviction may be the basis for canceling a voter’s registration, but requires federal prosecutors to notify state election officials of federal felony convictions.48 The Help America Vote Act of 2002 actually instructs state election officials to purge disenfranchised felons “on a regular basis” from their computerized voting lists.49 The enactment of these provisions plainly “suggests that Congress did not intend to sweep felon disenfranchisement laws within the scope of the VRA.”50

Not only that, in considering what ultimately became the Help America Vote Act, the Senate actually voted on a floor amendment that would have required states to allow felons to vote after they had completed their terms of incarceration, parole, or probation.51 The proposal would only have applied to federal elections—and its sponsors emphasized they had no quarrel with denying the franchise to convicts who were still serving their sentences. In the words of the principal sponsor, Senator Reid, who was then the majority whip,

We have a saying in this country: “If you do the crime, you have to do the time.” I agree with that. . . . [T]he amendment . . . is narrow in scope. It does not extend voting rights to prisoners. I don’t believe in that. It does not extend voting rights to ex-felons on parole, even though eighteen States do that.52

Despite being “narrow in scope,” the amendment was rejected by a large bipartisan majority: thirty-one yeas, sixty-three nays.53 Since then, bills have been repeatedly introduced in Congress that essentially copy Senator Reid’s proposal verbatim—but not one has so much as been voted out of committee.54 This legislative record belies the contention that Congress has ever sought to do away with felon disenfranchisement in any form.

B. The “Results” Test and the Claim of Disparate Impact

There is absolutely no indication in the legislative history of the 1982 amendments of the Voting Rights Act that the introduction of the word “results” was intended to create a simple disparate impact test. And the very language of the VRA as well as common sense undercuts any such claim of disparate impact: the continued requirement in the statute that the denial or abridgment of the right to vote be “on account of race or color” mimics the key phrase used in the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition of intentional racial discrimination.55 Indeed, the plain meaning of “on account of” is “for the sake of” or “by the reason of”—underscoring that “Congress did not wholly abandon its focus on purposeful discrimination when it amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982.”56

The inclusion of the phrase “on account of race or color” appears to modify the word
“results,” thereby requiring some causational link between intentional racial discrimination and “results.” Simply put, felon disenfranchisement laws may have a disproportional impact on certain racial minorities, but they do not violate the VRA because the impact is not on “account of,” “for the sake of,” or “by the reason of race or color.” As the Sixth Circuit said in rejecting a disparate impact-type VRA claim, felons are not “disenfranchised because of an immutable characteristic, such as race, but rather because of their conscious decision to commit a criminal act for which they assume the risks of detention and punishment.” Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit explained that Section 2 of the VRA explicitly retains racial bias as the gravamen of a . . . claim. The existence of some form of racial discrimination therefore remains the cornerstone of § 2 claims; to be actionable, a deprivation of the minority group's right to equal participation in the political process must be on account of a classification, decision, or practice that depends on race or color. The scope of the Voting Rights Act is indeed quite broad, but its rigorous protections, as the text of § 2 suggests, extend only to defeats experienced by voters ‘on account of race or color,’ not on account of some other racially neutral cause.

Accordingly, because “the causation of the denial of the right to vote to felons . . . consists entirely of their conviction, not their race,” it “does not ‘result’ from the state’s qualification of the right to vote on account of race or color and thus . . . does not violate the Voting Rights Act.” The “mere fact that many incarcerated felons happen to be black and [L]atino is insufficient grounds to implicate the Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act,” even under Section 2.

So, if statistics showing racial disparities alone are insufficient to establish a Section 2 violation even when the disparities directly relate to the electoral process, then statistics that are at least one step removed from that must also, by definition, be insufficient. Yet the case against felon disenfranchisement laws is based upon the assumption that “‘race-based disparities in sentencing’”—“that, as a result of racial discrimination in sentencing, black and Hispanic felons are more likely to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment . . . and are therefore more likely to be disenfranchised.” But the case law establishes clearly that “[e]vidence of statistical disparities in an area external to voting, which then result in statistical disparities in voting,” do not prove a Section 2 violation. Indeed, to ignore this case law would lead to an absurdity: felons would be allowed to prove a denial of voting rights as a result of racial discrimination in sentencing on the basis of evidence legally insufficient to establish an actual claim of racial discrimination in sentencing. In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court held that statistical disparities cannot be the basis for a Fourteenth Amendment claim to overturn a criminal conviction or sentence; a defendant must show that he himself or she herself suffered discrimination on the basis of race, and must show that on the basis of things that happened in his or her case. “Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process,” statistical evidence “is clearly insufficient to support any inference that any of the decision-makers in [a particular] case acted with discriminatory purpose.” This is so even in a capital case, as McCleskey was.

If the VRA were construed to ban felon disenfranchisement, then convicted felons could invoke the very same racial statistics that they cannot invoke to assert the right to walk the streets. That result alone would be odd, to say the least. And this “logic” moves swiftly from the
incongruous to the unimaginable: the VRA would probably abolish capital punishment nationwide because if similar statistical disparities appear in capital sentences, then the carrying out of such sentences, which plainly effect a permanent denial of the right to vote, would necessarily “result[] in a denial or abridgment of the right . . . to vote on account of race or color.”67

C. Any Prima Facie Showing of Adverse “Results” Is Easily Rebutted

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act established some form of a pure disparate impact standard, states could easily rebut any prima facie case of disproportional impact because of their strong and legitimate interests in maintaining their own electoral laws.68 As discussed in Section IV, states have substantial reasons to limit the right to vote to persons deemed trustworthy, and thereby exclude children, aliens, the mentally incompetent, and those who have been convicted of serious crimes.

The Supreme Court has held that “the State’s interest in maintaining an electoral system . . . is a legitimate factor to be considered by courts among the ‘totality of circumstances’ in determining whether a Section 2 violation [of the 1965 Act] has occurred.”69 Thus, for example, the en banc Fifth Circuit rejected a challenge to Texas’s county-wide election system for its district court judges—notwithstanding alleged disproportionate impact on minority candidates—on the grounds that the state had a “substantial interest” in linking jurisdiction and electoral base, and thereby promoting “the fact and appearance of judicial fairness.”70

There is little doubt that the states have an equally substantial interest in preventing felons, especially those still incarcerated, from voting and potentially affecting elections. Thus, the Sixth Circuit held that the state’s “legitimate and compelling interest” in disenfranchising felons outweighed any supposed racial impact.71 Indeed, the Framers of the Reconstruction Amendments found state authority to disenfranchise felons to be of such importance that they expressly permitted it in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.”72 As the Supreme Court put it, “[n]o function is more essential to the separate and independent existence of the States and their governments than the power to determine within the limits of the Constitution the qualifications of their own voters for state, county and municipal offices . . . .”73

D. The Clear Statement Rule: A Caution Against Preemption of States’ Powers

An expansive and unreasonable reading of the Voting Rights Act to cover felon disenfranchisement statutes not only is contrary to the intent of Congress but it also upsets the delicate balance between federal and state powers. The “clear statement” rule—which applies when the statutory text is ambiguous as in the case of the VRA—cautions courts to tread lightly in interpreting vague statutes to avoid impinging upon the traditional spheres of the states:

[I]f Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute . . . . [Congress must] make its intention clear and manifest if it intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States.74

This rule of construction controls whenever a federal statute touches on “traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance.”75 And when it applies, the rule requires that, absent a clear statement, courts must “interpret a statute to preserve rather than
destroy the States’ ‘substantial sovereign powers.’”

In *Gregory v. Ashcroft*, the Supreme Court faced the question of whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibited Missouri from enforcing a mandatory retirement age for state judges. The Court held that it did not. It applied the clear statement rule because the case implicated “the authority of the people of the States to determine the qualifications of their government officials.” The fact that Congress’s intent on the issue was “at least ambiguous” was enough to resolve the question: under the clear statement rule, it could not “give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity.”

Felon disenfranchisement involves authority that is at least as important as the State’s power to determine “the qualifications of their government officials,” as it involves the power to determine who gets to choose those officials and their qualifications. If defining the qualifications of important government officials lies at the heart of representative government, then surely defining who decides what those qualifications will be is equally, if not more, important. That by itself suffices to require a clear statement, but even more is involved here: the fundamental state power to “define[e] and enforce[e] the criminal law,” for which, of course, “the States possess primary authority.”

The confluence of these two fundamental lines of state authority, indeed, expressly appears in the Constitution’s text. Thus, not only does the Constitution defer to the States to set voter qualifications even for federal elections, but, as noted above, the Constitution affirmatively sanctions the States’ historic authority to disenfranchise people “for participation in rebellion, or other crime.” The States have the primary, if not exclusive, authority to decide whether felons should vote. That is what the Constitution provides.

Accordingly, if it is to disturb the federal-state balance in the area of voter qualifications, Congress must be clear—unmistakably clear—about it. And Congress certainly knows how to be quite clear when it comes to voting rights: it was clear about literacy tests; clear about educational-attainment requirements; clear about knowledge tests; clear about moral character tests; clear about vouching requirements; clear about English-language requirements; clear about English-only elections; and clear about poll taxes, to give just a few examples.

But the text of the VRA makes no unmistakably clear statement—it makes no statement at all—about felon disenfranchisement. And so it cannot be construed “to pre-empt the historic powers of the States” and “to destroy the States’ ‘substantial sovereign powers’” by prohibiting felon disenfranchisement.

III. The Enforcement Powers of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments

There is yet another reason why Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act cannot be read to bar felon disenfranchisement laws: such an interpretation would exceed Congress’s enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

These two Reconstruction amendments contain parallel grants of power to Congress to “enforce” the amendments’ substantive provisions “by appropriate legislation.” But as the Supreme Court has emphasized in recent years, Congress cannot rewrite the constitutional provisions, as “Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what that right is.” It has no power to engage in a “substantive redefinition of the . . . right at issue,” and can only
“enact prophylactic legislation”—legislation that “proscribes facially constitutional conduct”—to the extent necessary “in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct.”

Accordingly, the Supreme Court has insisted that “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” To meet that test, Congress must do two things: (a) “identify conduct transgressing . . . substantive provisions” of the amendments; and (b) “tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.”

The first requirement demands that Congress develop a “legislative record” that demonstrates a “history and pattern” of unconstitutional state conduct. In other words, “for Congress to enact proper enforcement legislation, there must be a record of constitutional violations.” To meet the second requirement, the purportedly prophylactic legislation must not be “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.” Congress thus must narrowly “tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.”

There can be no dispute: Section 2 would fail both tests if it were construed to prohibit felon disenfranchisement. To begin with, “when Congress enacted the VRA and its subsequent amendments, there was a complete absence of congressional findings that felon disenfranchisement laws were used to discriminate against minority voters.” That is enough to doom any construction of Section 2 that reaches felon disenfranchisement. In Oregon v. Mitchell, for example, the Supreme Court struck down the 1970 amendments to the VRA that, among other things, tried to lower from twenty-one to eighteen the minimum voting age throughout the Nation. The Court struck down the voting-age provision to the extent it applied to state elections. In announcing the Court’s judgment, Justice Black noted that “Congress made no legislative findings that the twenty-one-year-old vote requirement was used by the States to disenfranchise voters on account of race.” Congress has not made any such legislative findings about felon disenfranchisement, either.

Not only has Congress not found that felon disenfranchisement has produced “any significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination,” and not only does “the legislative record . . . simply fail[] to show that Congress did in fact identify such a pattern,” the record actually shows that Congress found the opposite. Congress saw nothing wrong with the “frequent requirement of States and political subdivisions that an applicant for voting or registration for voting be free of conviction of a felony,” because it found that this requirement was “objective, easily applied, and do[es] not lend [itself] to fraudulent manipulation.” It found that “tests for literacy or good moral character should be scrutinized, but felon disenfranchisement provisions should not.” In short, “not only has Congress failed ever to make a legislative finding that felon disenfranchisement is a pretext . . . for racial discrimination[,] it has effectively determined that it is not.”

To apply Section 2 to strike down all felon disenfranchisement laws, would be “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.” Instead, it would “attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections”—something the Constitution simply does not allow.
IV. The Policy Reasons for Felon Disenfranchisement

During a 2000 presidential debate in Iowa, the frontrunner candidate explicitly endorsed the ban on felon voting: “The principle that convicted felons do not have a right to vote is an old one, it is well-established,” he said, adding that “felonies—certainly heinous crimes—should result in a disenfranchisement.”

That candidate was Vice President Al Gore. And, as set forth below, he had good policy reasons for supporting the ban on felon voting. But this issue has grown heavily politicized in recent years, in large part due to the contested results in Florida in 2000. However, if it is soberly analyzed outside the prism of partisan politics, there are strong justifications for felon disenfranchisement.

First, felon disenfranchisement laws are justified on the basis of the Lockean notion of a social contract: As Judge Henry Friendly once put it, someone “who breaks the laws” may “fairly have been thought to have abandoned the right to participate” in making them. Furthermore,

It can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that the(?) perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the legislators who make the laws, the executives who enforce these, the prosecutors who must try them for further violations, or the judges who are to consider their cases.

That same reasoning motivated Massachusetts then-governor Paul Celluci in 2000 to support a ballot initiative stripping incarcerated felons of the right to vote after prisoners began to organize a political action committee. A Massachusetts state legislative leader commented about the State’s now-abolished practice of allowing incarcerated felons to vote: “It makes no sense. We incarcerate people and we take away their right to run their own lives and leave them with the ability to influence how we run our lives?”

Second, disenfranchisement has traditionally been deemed a part of punishment for committing a crime. Criminal punishment can be meted out in various ways, including imprisonment, fines, probation, and, yes, the withdrawal of certain rights and privileges. In the American system, it has long been established that “the States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.”

But even more fundamentally, society considers convicts, even those who have completed their prison terms, to be less trustworthy and responsible than non-convicted citizens. In other areas of the law, full rights and privileges are not always restored to convicts, even though they may have “paid their debt to society.” For example, federal law prohibits the possession of a firearm for anyone indicted for or convicted of a felony punishable by at least one year in prison. Also under federal law, anyone who has a “charge pending” or has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for one year or more cannot serve on a jury. So if someone who has a “charge pending” against him is deemed incapable of sitting in judgment of the fate of a single litigant, it hardly seems unreasonable to say that someone convicted of a felony cannot help shape the fate of a city, a state, or the entire nation. Even outside the realm of civic rights and privileges, society recognizes that an ex-convict may be less
reliable than others. For example, employers routinely ask prospective employees whether they have been arrested (let alone convicted of a felony) because they suspect that the mere fact of an arrest may be an indication of untrustworthiness.

Critics of felon disenfranchisement laws note that these laws have a disproportionate impact on certain racial minority groups. While society can be sensitive to such concerns, it is not a sufficient reason to abolish longstanding and justifiable laws in the attempt to achieve some form of racial balance. As W.E.B. DuBois once wrote, “Draw lines of crime, of incompetency, of vice, as tightly and uncompromisingly as you will, for these things must be proscribed; but a color-line not only does not accomplish this purpose, but thwarts it.” In fact, the abolition of felon disenfranchisement laws may have the unintended effect of creating “anti-law enforcement” voting blocs and victimizing the vast majority of law-abiding citizens who live in high-crime urban areas—people who are themselves disproportionately black and Latino. The political left’s compassion—ignoring the effect of its agenda on law-abiding people of color—is misplaced. Ultimately the real solution is to deter and prevent the crimes from being committed, not to create loopholes and exceptions for punishments.

Yet there may be some room for reasonable compromise on the issue of felon franchise. Not all crimes are equal, and some crimes are more reprehensible and more likely to suggest untrustworthiness. One can make a convincing case that someone who has committed a relatively minor crime and who has exhibited good behavior for an extended period of time upon the completion of his prison or parole term can request that his right to vote be restored. Indeed, the National Commission on Federal Election Reform—a bipartisan, blue-ribbon panel chaired by former Presidents Ford and Carter—has made a similar recommendation. The restoration of an ex-convict’s voting right should be done on a case-by-case basis through an administrative mechanism because it would be difficult to draft a statute that draws a bright-line rule taking into account factors such as the seriousness of the crime, the potential for recidivism, and the number of prior offenses.

V. Conclusion

The people of forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have made their voices clear in support of laws that disenfranchise felons. Neither the Constitution nor the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides plausible grounds to invalidate the felon disenfranchisement laws that are on the books today. And it would be a crime to distort the Constitution or the intent of Congress to overturn the will of the people of forty-eight states via judicial fiat.
ENDNOTES


2 The current felon disenfranchisement laws in D.C., the population of which is sixty percent African-American (JESSE McKINNON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2000 (2001), http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-5.pdf), were enacted by its own locally-elected Council after the introduction of home rule in 1974, and they were submitted to, and not objected to, by the Congress of the United States, the very body claimed here to have outlawed felon disenfranchisement.

3 See MASS. CONST. amend. III, as amended by MASS. Const. amend. CX (rendering “persons who are incarcerated in a correctional facility due to a felony conviction” ineligible to vote); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 51, § 1 (2001) (decreasing the same law).

4 See http://www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/elebalm/balm2000.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2005) (stating the results of the aforementioned referendum under Question Number Two).

5 See UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (declaring that “any person convicted of a felony . . . may not be permitted to vote . . . until the right to vote . . . is restored as provided by statute”); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-2-101.5 (1953) (permitting restoration of franchise to felons on probation, discharged from incarceration, or paroled).

6 See http://governor.state.ut.us/lt_gov/98GenPropView.htm (detailing the election results for statewide proposition number four).

7 See, e.g., Uggen & Manza, supra note 7, at 789-90.


11 ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 62-63 (Basic Books ed., 2000); see also NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 45 (2001), http://millercenter.virginia.edu/programs/natl_commissions/final_report.html (noting that “the practice of denying the vote to individuals convicted of certain crimes is a very old one that existed under English law, in the colonies, and in the earliest suffrage laws of the states”).


13 Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1228 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc).

14 KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 63.

15 KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 63.


17 See KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 162 (arguing that late nineteenth century disenfranchisement laws outside the South “lacked socially distinct targets and generally were passed in matter-of-fact fashions”); Uggen & Manza, supra note 1, at 795 (explaining that some Southern states from 1890 to 1910 did act with racial intent in passing laws that disenfranchised persons who were convicted of crimes, but by that time, over eighty percent of the states in the U.S. already had felon disenfranchisement laws); Alexander Keyssar, Did States Restrict the Voting Rights of Felons on Account of Racism?, HIST. NEWS NETWORK, Oct. 4, 2004, http://hn.nus/articles/7635.html (noting that even in some states in the post-Civil War South, “felon disenfranchisement provisions were first enacted [by] … Republican governments that supported black voting rights”).

18 See KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 55-56 & Figure 3.1 (explaining that by 1855, twenty-five of the thirty States had express “race exclusions” that prevented blacks from voting, and the five that did not “contained only [four] percent of the free black population”).

19 Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1218.

20 Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 928 (2d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
(plurality opinion) (holding that the Fifteenth Amendment “prohibits only purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgement by government of the freedom to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude”).

“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision on account of race or color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982) (emphasis added). It has previously read: “No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”
any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”

41 Accord Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1229 (discussing the ambiguity in the Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in its application to the felon disenfranchisement provisions); see Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 116 (analyzing the scope of the Voting Rights Act to determine if it encompasses states’ disenfranchisement provisions and thereby creates a constitutional question) (quoting Goosby v. Town Bd., 180 F.3d 476, 499 (2d Cir. 1999)) (Leval, J., concurring).

42 U.S. CONST. amend. XV (emphasis added).

43 See Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 117 (reasoning that the Congress did not abandon its focus on purposeful racial discrimination with the amendment in 1982) (quoting Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1515 (11th Cir. 1994)).

44 See Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44-45 (1986) (establishing the following factors in determining validity of challenges under Section 2: the extent to which minority group members have been elected to public office; and the extent to which voting in the state or political subdivision is racially polarized, also recognizing that other supportive factors may exist, but that these are not essential to a minority voter’s claim of dilution).

45 See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1233-35 (emphasis added) (analyzing congressional records to find legislative intent for the Voting Rights Act’s application to felon disenfranchisement provisions).

46 See, e.g., Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 123-24 (noting prevalence of felon disenfranchisement as a form of punishment in most states throughout U.S. history, quoted in Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234 (“considering the prevalence of felon disenfranchisement in every region of the country since the Founding, it seems unfathomable that Congress would silently amend the Voting Rights Act in a way that would affect them”).

47 See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234 (emphasis in original).


49 Accord Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234 (discussing the various laws that Congress has enacted making it easier for states to disenfranchise felons).

50 See 148 CONG. REC. S797-98 (Feb. 14, 2002) (proposed amendment 2879 to S. 565).

51 See 148 CONG. REC. S801-02 (statement of Sen. Reid) (speaking in favor of the amendment which, aside from its narrow scope, could serve as an example to states); see also 148 CONG. REC. S804-05 (statement of co-sponsor, Sen. Specter).

52 See id. at S809 (noting that twenty-three Democrats, forty Republicans voted “nay”).


54 U.S. CONST. amend. XV (emphasis added).


56 See Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 117 (analyzing the language of the 1982 amended Voting Rights Act to determine the legislative intent).

57 Accord Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (holding that disenfranchisement provisions do not deny people a right to vote due to an immutable characteristic, but because of their criminal acts), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 353 F.3d 1287, 1303 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a fact-finder could conclude under the totality of circumstances test that the plaintiff’s evidence demonstrates intentional racial discrimination behind Florida’s felon disenfranchisement provisions), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004); aff’d, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that the Voting Rights Act’s prohibition against voting qualifications that result in abridgment of the right to vote on account of race does not apply to Florida’s felon disenfranchisement provisions); see Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986) (concluding that the disproportionate impact on Tennessee’s black population did not result from Tennessee’s qualification of the right to vote on account of race or color); see also Jones v. Edgar, 3 F. Supp. 2d 979, 981 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that the plaintiff failed to show any connection between historical discrimination against blacks and the felon disenfranchisement provisions).

See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1239 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring) (holding that the facts presented in this case show no other causation than the criminal activity of the ex-felons for the denial to their right to vote).

Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1262 (emphasis added).

See Jones, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 981.

See, e.g., Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 118 (emphasis by the Court) (quoting felon-appellant’s brief).

See Farrakhan, 359 F.3d at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that statistical disparities are not enough to establish vote denial under section two of the Voting Rights Act). See also Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d at 1262 (6th Cir. 1985) (upholding Tennessee’s felon disenfranchisement provision against a Section 2 claim that was based, as here, on statistical disparities in conviction rates); Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Office of City Commissioners, 28 F.3d 306, 314-15 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that no evidence was presented to show that the neutral vote purging law discriminates against a particular class); Salas v. Southwest Texas Junior College District, 964 F.2d 1542, 1556 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the plaintiff failed to link low voter turnout by the Hispanic population to past official discrimination); Irby v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (4th Cir. 1989) (deciding that the disparities between whites and blacks in representative positions does not in itself show that discrimination played a role in the selection or election process).

See 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (ruling that the evidence failed to show that any decision maker in defendant’s case acted with a discriminatory purpose, and that the statistical racially-correlated discrepancy did not show a significant risk of racial bias in Georgia’s capital sentencing process).

Id. at 297.


See Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1260-61 (holding that when the felon disenfranchisement law is viewed in context of “totality of circumstances,” it is apparent that the law does not violate the VRA).

See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1232 (analyzing the constitutional implications of applying the Voting Rights Act to state felon disenfranchisement provisions).


Id. at 461 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).


See id. at 463.

Id. at 464, 467 (emphasis in original; citation and internal quotation marks omitted).


See U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 2, cl.1 (requiring that those who elect United States Representatives “shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislatures”).

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).

See 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(C) (2005) (prohibiting states from conducting literacy tests as a qualification for voting unless it is administered to all voters, is wholly in writing, and answers are provided to voters within twenty-five days upon request); id. at § 1971(a)(3)(B) (defining literacy test as “any test of the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c)(1) (2005) (explaining that the phrase “test or device shall mean “any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter”).

Id. at § 1973b(c)(2) (explaining that literacy tests include tests to “demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject”).

Id.

Id. at § 1973b(c)(3).

Id. at § 1973b(c)(4).
88 See id. at § 1973b(e)(1) (prohibiting the States from conditioning the right to vote upon the ability to understand the English language).
89 See id. at § 1973(b)(f)(1) (forbidding the States from holding English-only elections because of widespread discrimination of citizens who do not speak English).
90 Id. at § 1973(h)(a) (finding that poll taxes have no relation to the electoral process, prevent poor citizens from voting and have been used as a means to deter minorities from voting).
91 Gregory, 501 U.S. 452 at 461.
93 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; id. at amend. XV, § 2.
97 Flores, 521 U.S. at 520.
100 Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1231.
101 Flores, 521 U.S. at 532 (1997).
102 College Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. at 628.
103 Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1231 (emphasis added).
105 Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
106 See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (striking down application of Americans with Disabilities Act against State employers because “[t]he legislative record . . . simply fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern” of unconstitutional discrimination by States against the disabled); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000) (striking down civil remedy for gender-motivated violence because “Congress’s findings indicate that the problem of discrimination against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States, or even most States”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (striking down application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act against State employers because of “Congress’s failure to uncover any significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination here”).
107 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
108 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369.
111 Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1233.
112 Baker, 85 F.3d at 929.
114 Id. at 509.
116 Green, 380 F.2d at 451.
117 Id.
118 Clegg, supra note 81 at 172-73.
119 Id. at 172 (emphasis added; quoting Editorial, Jailhouse Vote, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1999, at A26 (quoting Massachusetts State Rep. Francis Marini)).
122 Clegg, supra note 68, at 174.
123 Id.

127 Clegg, supra note 68, at 176.
128 Id. at 177.
129 Id. at 174.
130 Id.

131 See NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELEC. REFORM, supra note 11, at 45 (emphasis added) (recommending disenfranchisement until felons have fully served their sentences, including any term of probation or parole, or alternatively a lifetime disenfranchisement that nonetheless permits a clemency-like mechanism for restoring the franchise, in “particular cases”); see also NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELEC. REFORM, Building Confidence in U.S. Elections, at http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf, Sept. 2005, at 4.6.1 (recommending that “States should allow for restoration of voting rights to otherwise eligible citizens who have been convicted of a felony (other than for a capital crime or one which requires enrollment with an offender registry for sex crimes) once they have fully served their sentence, including any term of probation or parole.”).